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information had a major role in the loan decision making process and that higher frequency of contact 
increased the significance of informal information. 
 
Keywords  relationship lending, credit access, informal information 
 
Aalto-yliopisto, PL 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Maisterintutkinnon tutkielman tiivistelmä 
 
 
 
Tekijä  Ilona Vaateri 
Työn nimi  The effect of relationship lending on SME’s credit access 
Tutkinto  Kauppatieteiden Maisteri 
Koulutusohjelma  Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 
Työn ohjaaja  Teemu Kautonen 
Hyväksymisvuosi  2017 Sivumäärä  52 Kieli  Englanti 
Tiivistelmä 
Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan luottosuhteen merkitystä pienten ja keskisuurten yritysten (pk-yritys-
ten) lainansaantiin yritysten näkökulmasta. Luottosuhteella tarkoitetaan lainanantomenetelmää, joka 
perustuu nk. pehmeän tiedon keräämiseen lainanhakijasta pankkisuhteen aikana. Pehmeä tieto eroaa 
kovasta tiedosta siten, että kova tieto on vahvistettua ja julkisesti saatavilla olevaa tietoa yrityksen 
taloudellisesta tilanteesta, ja sen keräämiseen ei tarvita henkilökohtaista kontaktia lainanantajan ja –
saajan välillä. 
Tutkielma perustuu yrityksille suunnattuun kyselytutkimukseen, johon osallistui 433 suomalaista 
pk-yritystä. Luottosuhteen muuttujina tutkimuksessa tarkasteltiin epämuodollisen informaation roo-
lia, yrityksen pankkisuhteen pituutta ensisijaisessa pankissa sekä yhteydenpidon taajuutta lainanhoi-
tajan ja yrityksen edustajan välillä. Tutkielmassa tarkasteltiin, että miten edellä mainitut selittävät 
muuttujat vaikuttivat selitettävään muuttujaan, eli saiko lainanhakija lainahakeuksessa haettavan lai-
nan täysimääräisenä vai ei. Menetelmänä käytettiin binääristä logistista regressiota. 
Tulokset tukevat hypoteesia, että epämuodollisella informaatiolla oli suuri merkitys yritysten lai-
nansaannin kannalta. Tulokset esittävät, että mikäli epämuodollisen informaation rooli lainanhaku-
prosessissa oli merkittävä, yritykselle myönnettiin haettu lainamäärä todennäköisemmin, kuin jos 
epämuodollisen informaation rooli oli vähäinen. Hypoteesit pankkisuhteen pituudesta ja yhteydenpi-
don taajuudesta hylättiin, sillä regressioanalyysin tulokset eivät olleet tilastollisesti merkitseviä. Tut-
kielman toissijaisessa mallissa tarkasteltiin pankkisuhteen pituuden sekä yhteydenpidon taajuuden 
vaikutusta epämuodollisen informaation merkitsevyyteen. Mallin tulokset indikoivat, että yhteyden-
pidon taajuudella oli merkittävä vaikutus. Hypoteesi osoittaa, että mitä useammin yrityksen edustaja 
oli yhteydessä lainanhoitajaan, sitä suurempi oli epämuodollisen informaation merkitys lainananto-
prosessissa. 
Tämä tutkielma edistää tutkimusta yritysten ja pankkien välisistä luottosuhteista tarkastelemalla 
viitekehystä yrityksen näkökulmasta. Lisäksi, tulokset tukevat aiempia tutkimuksia osoittamalla, että 
epämuodollisella informaatiolla oli merkittävä rooli lainanantoprosessissa ja että suuremmalla yhtey-
denpidolla oli positiivinen vaikutus epämuodollisen informaation merkitsevyyteen. 
Avainsanat  luottosuhteet, lainansaanti, kova ja pehmeä tieto 
 
 
  
Table of contents 
1	 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1	
1.1	 Research objectives ........................................................................................ 2	
1.2	 Contributions and findings in brief ................................................................ 3	
1.3	 Structure of the thesis ..................................................................................... 4	
2	 LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................ 5	
2.1	 Lending to SMEs as a principal-agent problem ............................................. 5	
2.1.1	 Problems related to SMEs lack of sufficient financing ..................... 8	
2.1.2	 The role of hard and soft information in bank relationships ............. 9	
2.2	 Transaction lending and SME financing ...................................................... 11	
2.2.1	 Transaction lending techniques ....................................................... 11	
2.2.2	 Transaction lending in the SME context ......................................... 13	
2.3	 The relationship lending framework ............................................................ 15	
2.3.1	 The empirical determinants of relationship lending ........................ 15	
2.3.2	 The common relationship lending attributes ................................... 18	
2.3.3	 The effects of relationship lending .................................................. 21	
2.4	 Hypotheses ................................................................................................... 24	
3	 DATA AND METHODS ...................................................................................... 27	
3.1	 Survey and data ............................................................................................ 27	
3.2	 Methods ........................................................................................................ 28	
3.3	 Reliability of the study ................................................................................. 31	
4	 RESULTS .............................................................................................................. 35	
4.1	 Hypothesis tests ........................................................................................... 35	
4.2	 Discussion .................................................................................................... 37	
5	 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 40	
5.1	 Research summary ....................................................................................... 40	
5.2	 Limitations of the study ............................................................................... 41	
5.3	 Suggestions for further research .................................................................. 41	
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 43	
 
 
  
 
List of figures 
Figure 1	 The empirical determinants of relationship lending ............................ 17	
Figure 2 	 The hypotheses .................................................................................... 26	
 
List of tables 
Table 1 	 Descriptive statistics ............................................................................ 32	
Table 2 	 Correlation matrix ............................................................................... 33	
Table 3 	 Binary logit estimates .......................................................................... 36	
 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In terms of growth, innovation, job creation and social integration, the European Com-
mission (2017) sees small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurship as the 
backbone of European Union’s (EU) economy. SMEs are currently in the focal point in 
the enterprise policies in the EU. SMEs expansion, innovations and new investments are 
required in order to maintain competitiveness and foster growth. It is necessary to ena-
ble the financially healthy SMEs to flourish and expand in order to ensure their eco-
nomic health (European Commission, 2017). However, due to their small size, lower 
creditworthiness and lenders’ limited access to accurate information, SMEs do not have 
an easy access for the most competitive financing options, as opposed to large enter-
prises (Berger & Udell 1995; Berger, Klapper & Udell 2001). In addition, access to ad-
ditional equity can be challenging for SMEs. Often the current shareholders have al-
ready invested their available assets at the start-up phase and the acquisition of external 
financing is difficult, but most importantly it reduces the managers’ share of ownership 
and therefore restricts the freedom of managing the company at its early stages (Moro & 
Fink 2012).  
Due to these reasons bank loans are the most common source of financing for SMEs 
and companies in their early stages. Lately, SMEs bank relationships and credit access 
have attracted a wide amount of scholarly attention and the information is important for 
the policymakers in the works of developing more efficient enterprise policies. The re-
search has focused on the key aspects which may reduce the information gap between 
the lenders (bank) and borrowers (company), because typically, the lenders have experi-
enced difficulties discriminating between good and bad businesses (Howorth & Moro 
2006; Moro & Fink 2012; Howorth & Moro 2012; Moro, Fink & Kautonen 2012).  
Banks have only limited access to the publicly available information on the current 
state of the SMEs economic situation. Analysing past data does not give the most realis-
tic image of the companies’ performance, especially for assessing the success of future 
investments of new businesses. The borrower has a lot more information about the pro-
spective risks and returns of the investment than the lender, and this situation is referred 
to as information asymmetry (Moro, Fink & Kautonen 2012). Berger & Allen (1995) ar-
gue that asymmetric information leads to inefficient distribution of bank financing both 
from the bank’s and the company’s point of view. Firstly, the credit risk and transaction 
  
 
cost for the bank is higher if the bank is not able to collect the necessary information ef-
fectively regarding the company’s economic state. Secondly, the cost of financing is set 
higher the less the bank trusts their credit client. If the bank had more information on 
the company’s economic state, they could potentially grant loans with lower interest 
rates and better loan conditions, which would benefit the borrowers. Furthermore, 
Moro, Fink and Kautonen (2012) suggest that all strategies, which reduce the infor-
mation asymmetries, are beneficial to everyone, apart from bad entrepreneurs: healthy 
and good businesses have easier access to finance, the entire society benefits from suc-
cessful companies that are able to grow and sustain their business activities and the 
lenders are able to reduce their default rates. 
Moro and Fink’s (2012 pg. 927) research concluded, “SMEs that enjoy high level of 
trust from loan managers obtain more credit and are less credit constrained”. They de-
termined that if companies wish to fulfil their financial needs with better terms, for good 
companies, it is beneficial to disclose additional information to banks voluntarily. More-
over, banks gather information about the lenders throughout the banking relationship, 
and use this information to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness. This rationing is 
based on a concept called relationship lending, which is characterized by multiple varia-
bles such as the length of the bank relationship, the age of the company and the com-
pany’s willingness to voluntarily disclose information to the persons in charge of loan 
decisions. Relationship lending is generally defined as a long-term implicit contract be-
tween the lender and the borrower. The relationship lending technique further suggests 
that the relationship between the lender and the borrower, improves the lender’s ability 
to assess how credit-worthy the borrower is (Elsas 2005, Moro & Fink 2012). 
1.1 Research objectives 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of relationship lending on SMEs 
credit access from the companies’ point of view. The research question is ‘How do the 
soft factors in the SMEs bank relationships affect bank loan decisions from the SMEs 
point of view?’. The theoretical framework is based on the principal-agent theory, 
which suggests that asymmetrical information results in an information gap between the 
principal and agent in a transaction (Akerlof 1970; Berger and Udell 1995). The previ-
ous research on asymmetrical information in banking relationships and the different 
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lending techniques attempt to determine which methods and attributes are significant in 
terms of reducing the information gap in the bank relationship. The theoretical frame-
work of this thesis is based around relationship lending, which is a lending technique 
based on the relationship between a bank and a company.  
This study builds on the previous research and enhances the studies results by look-
ing at the topic from the SMEs point of view. The aim of this study is to assess whether 
certain relationship lending attributes within the bank relationship have a significant ef-
fect on the SMEs credit access. The relationship lending attributes taken into considera-
tion are the role of informal information, the length of relationship with the primary 
bank and the frequency of contact with the loan manager. 
1.2 Contributions and findings in brief 
The study in this thesis is based on a survey of 433 small to medium sized enterprises in 
Finland. The attributes are tested with a binary logistic regression over the binary de-
pendent variable which measures whether the company accessed the amount of credit 
they primarily asked for or not.  
The results on the primary model support the hypothesis, that informal information 
plays a significant role in the credit decision process. The results indicate that if infor-
mal information had a major role in the loan decision process, that company was more 
likely to access credit. The hypotheses for the length of relationship and the frequency 
of contact with the loan manager were not supported by the model. However, on a sec-
ondary model, the frequency of contact with the role manager does have a significant 
impact on the role of informal information. This suggests, that the more often the com-
pany representatives are in contact with the loan manager, the more important is the role 
of informal information in the loan decision making process. 
This thesis contributes to the existing research on relationship lending by examining 
the concept from a firm perspective. Furthermore, the results support the earlier studies 
by suggesting that informal information had a major role in the loan decision making 
process and that higher frequency of contact increased the significance of informal in-
formation. 
  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This paper is constructed under three main chapters following this introduction. The se-
cond chapter under the title Literature review introduces the theoretical framework of 
the thesis in the form of a literature review. The three major topics of the literature re-
view are “Lending to SMEs as a principal-agent problem” and the two different lending 
techniques, “Transaction lending” and “Relationship lending”. The final subchapter of 
the Literature review sums up the theoretical framework by introducing the hypotheses 
for this thesis.  
The third chapter Data and methods firstly describes how the primary survey data 
was collected and how the data was broken down and clarified for the use of the study. 
Secondly, the chapter describes the methods and variables used in the regression model.  
The fourth chapter Results discusses the hypothesis test results and how they can be 
interpreted in the relationship lending context. The final chapter Conclusions draws to-
gether the key outcomes of this research and the final comments include limitations of 
the study along with suggestions for further research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review introduces the theoretical framework and key studies, 
which have contributed and spurred the current research up to this date. The theoretical 
framework of relationship lending construes the hypothesis development of this thesis. 
Firstly, the discussion goes back to the bottom line theory of principal-agent problems 
caused by asymmetric information. Secondly, transaction lending will be considered in 
the SME context. Thirdly, the theoretical framework for relationship lending will be in-
troduced. The final sub chapter draws together the research questions and hypotheses 
derived from the earlier studies.  
The effects of soft information on debt financing for SMEs have been under research 
recently. In their respective studies, Howorth & Moro (2006), Moro & Fink (2012), 
Moro, Fink and Kautonen (2012) and Kautonen, Fredriksson & Minniti (2016) have 
considered the roles of trust, voluntary information disclosure and entrepreneurial com-
petence of SMEs within the relationship lending framework. Their research and contri-
butions serve as the basis of this thesis, and the results of their work will carry through-
out the literature review.  
2.1 Lending to SMEs as a principal-agent problem 
Ever since Akerlof (1970) discussed the principal-agent theory and the concept of asym-
metric information through the example of “lemons” in the car market, the theoretical 
framework has become a basis for an extensive amount of studies and it has been 
widely applied in economic research. The topics range from behavioural economics to 
the effectiveness of the financial markets, as asymmetric information is commonly fea-
tured in various market interactions (Grossman 1981; Spence 1973; Stiglitz & Weiss 
1981).  
The following citation from Lofgren, Persson, & Weibull’s (2002 pg. 196) study ef-
fectively summarizes the phenomenon of markets with asymmetric information: “In all 
cases, however, a key to the answer relies on one and the same observation: one side of 
the market is better informed than the other. The borrower knows more than the lender 
about his creditworthiness; the seller knows more than the buyer about the quality of his 
car; the CEO and board of a firm know more than the shareholders about the profitabil-
  
 
ity of the firm--“. Asymmetric information can result in inefficient outcomes in the mar-
ket economy, and can cause adverse selection and moral hazard problems in market 
transactions (Akerlof 1970). 
The principal-agent theory is the core basis of earlier studies regarding SMEs bank 
relationships, and this paper will build up on the earlier results (Berger & Udell 1995; 
Berger & Udell 2002; Howorth & Moro 2006; Moro & Fink 2012; Moro, Fink & Kau-
tonen 2012; Moro, Fink & Maresch 2015). Information asymmetry refers to a situation 
in which two parties are in a transaction situation, and the other party possesses more 
information regarding the transaction than the other. The parties are called principal and 
agent, which in this case refer to the lender and the borrower.  
The problem of asymmetric information in bank relationships arises when the princi-
pals (banks) try to determine whether the agents (companies) are creditworthy and 
whether they are able to repay their loans altogether and in due time. The companies 
have more information about their economic state and future prospects than the banks, 
and in order to make a good loan decision, the bank attempts to reduce the information 
gap whilst keeping the agency costs at a minimum (Akerlof 1970; Howorth & Moro 
2006). Loan managers base their perceptions about the company on the available hard 
information complemented by the soft information they have collected throughout the 
bank relationship. Voluntarily disclosed information by the company further reduces the 
information gap, but is commonly not categorized as soft information per se, as it can 
also be hard information depending on the nature of the information. Soft information 
forms the basis of the relationship lending framework. The differentiation between hard 
and soft information and voluntarily disclosed information will be further explained in 
the following subchapter. 
Berger & Udell (1995) researched small firm financing and looked into the role of 
relationship lending by examining price and non-price terms of bank credit. They stated 
that typically, banks manage asymmetric information problems firstly by producing and 
analysing available information, but as an effective means, they can also charge higher 
interest or require collateral in order to improve the borrower’s incentives. Their study 
concluded that for small firms, longer banking relationships result in lower interest rates 
and they are less likely to be pledged for a collateral. In addition, they suggest that 
banks collect private information throughout the bank relationship, which can then be 
used for assessing the borrower’s creditworthiness. These findings are in line with the 
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theoretical argumentation for improved knowledge on borrower quality through rela-
tionship lending, and forms the basis for discussion on bank relationships. 
Berger & Udell (2006) summarized the characteristics of informationally opaque 
SMEs credit availability in an overall conceptual framework describing the issue from 
multiple perspectives around the globe, both in developed and developing countries. 
Their findings serve as a good base for understanding the different lending techniques 
and the implications of different surrounding restrictions. They considered the restric-
tive implications of the surrounding lending infrastructure and the financial institutions 
structure for informationally transparent and opaque SMEs credit availability. Lending 
infrastructure consists of the information environment, the legal environment, juridical 
environment and tax and regulatory environments. The financial institutions structure 
consists of the different types of credit providers and the competition between these in-
stitutions. These factors limit the different lending techniques SMEs could potentially 
employ in their financing. They argued that depending on the characteristics of the lend-
ing environment, relationship lending might not be the most effective technique for 
SMEs, especially for large credit institutions. The different lending environments are 
further described in the subchapter The empirical determinants of relationship lending. 
Various transaction lending techniques, such as asset based-lending and credit scor-
ing, are feasible for SMEs in situations where the lending infrastructure might limit the 
trustworthiness of the most traditional lending techniques. The most common transac-
tion lending techniques will be describer in the subchapter under Transaction lending. 
Berger and Udell (2006) emphasized the importance of a well-developed lending infra-
structure as a significant implication towards being able to utilize multiple lending tech-
niques. However, multiple studies suggest relationship lending in the SME context as 
the most effective means to reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and 
lenders. The two different lending techniques, relationship lending and transaction lend-
ing, will further be discussed separately in the following chapters. 
Moro, Fink and Maresch (2015) studied the effect of reducing information asymme-
tries on the amount of credit provided to SMEs in Italy. They considered multiple fac-
tors regarding the information loan managers gather from SMEs, namely the quality, 
quantity, completeness and timeliness. Their conclusion was that a reduction in infor-
mation asymmetry has a significant impact towards the amount of credit the SMEs ob-
tained. Moro et al. (2015) study was the the first one which proved the fact that infor-
mation asymmetry reduction directly results in better access to credit. 
  
 
2.1.1 Problems related to SMEs lack of sufficient financing 
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) summarized an extensive amount of recent empirical 
research regarding SMEs growth constraints and they concluded that in terms of SMEs 
growth potential, poor access to finance acts as a major constraint. As discussed before, 
although SMEs share within the private sector is substantial, their access to credit is 
more challenging as opposed to large corporations and lack of sufficient financing poses 
them a competitive disadvantage and restricts their growth potential. Companies, which 
operate in countries with well-developed financial and legal institutions, are in a rela-
tively better position in terms of credit financing. However, in the case of undeveloped 
institutions, the barriers can be lowered in other ways such as, by introducing new inno-
vative means of financing, new systems for information sharing and by posing higher 
competition amongst banks.  
The problems related to lack of financing for SMEs are more extensive in developing 
countries with undeveloped financial institutions. However, as the banking industry is 
going through a major transformation within the near future, the SMEs are facing new 
challenges in terms of accessing credit financing. Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) 
raised the concern of banking industry consolidation, which creates large banks that are 
less able to provide relationship lending services for SMEs and their focus shifts more 
towards serving large corporate customers. This lessens the relationship lending ori-
ented companies’ ability to depend on local bank relationships where information of the 
companies relevant to relationship lending financing has been accumulated over time. 
Berger et als. research confirms that informationally opaque small businesses are less 
likely to access credit from large and foreign banks.  
Another issue Berger et al. (2001) raised was how financial distress affects SMEs ac-
cess to credit. Bank distress may result in small companies seeking credit from multiple 
sources, which reduces the benefits of relationship lending and increases the costs re-
lated to credit acquisition. In other terms, as will be discussed later in the chapter for re-
lationship lending, lending from multiple banks versus a single bank is a key determi-
nant of relationship lending. 
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2.1.2 The role of hard and soft information in bank relationships 
Petersen (2004) notes that the distinction between hard and soft information in finance 
literature has not been explicitly verified and agreed upon by different research institu-
tions. The distinction varies and it depends on which institution is gathering the infor-
mation, as their information needs differ from one other. As an attempt to clarify the 
distinction in his paper, Petersen lays out the characteristics of information and how the 
information is collected and processed. He states that the two most important differ-
ences between hard and soft information are firstly, that hard information is usually rec-
orded as numbers, whereas soft information is recorded as text. Secondly, hard infor-
mation is more comparable and does not require personal collection methods as op-
posed to soft information. Bertomeu & Marinovic (2015) state that commonly hard in-
formation refers to officially verified, quantitative and publicly available financial infor-
mation in financial literature. Audited financial statements fall into this scope and they 
most commonly serve as the basis for financial analysis. 
When it comes to collecting hard information from SMEs, Moro, Fink & Kautonen 
(2012) argue that the quantity and accuracy of SMEs publicly available hard infor-
mation is limited due to various external and internal reasons. Companies’ financial re-
porting is directed by legal requirements and financial reporting standards, but for 
small, non-listed firms the requirements are not as specific. Therefore, the financial re-
ports are not standardized and as informative as for listed companies. Also, the strategic 
decisions taken by the management concerning financial reports might result in biased 
reporting. As a result, financial statements, and the hard information derived from them, 
do not provide with the best available information about SMEs economic state as such. 
Furthermore, hard financial data only tells about the past results, whereas in loan deci-
sion making, the main interest is in the future prospects of the companies. The main rea-
son for applying additional credit is to finance future investment plans and expansion in 
most cases, and financial statements do not provide with relevant information regarding 
the future. This justifies the fact, that the use of soft information is necessary in order to 
get a coherent and comprehensive understanding about SMEs economic state in the fu-
ture in loan decision making (Ang, 1992).  
Bertomeu & Marinovic (2015) define that soft information refers to voluntarily dis-
closed informal information, such as press releases or unaudited statements, but this 
doesn’t serve for the purpose of collecting privately held soft information, that is only 
  
 
available for the specific borrower collecting the information, which is the core of rela-
tionship lending. For the purpose of this thesis soft information is defined as private and 
informal qualitative information, that has been gathered over a period of a long-term 
bank relationship with the SME. The information is gathered from interaction with the 
SME’s owner or other members of the SME community. (Moro, Fink & Kautonen, 
2012; Berger & Udell, 2006).  
Berger & Udell (2006) further construe that soft information builds up on factors 
such as the character and reliability of the owner based on the subjective contact over 
time with the loan manager, transaction history of the SMEs past loan provision and the 
record of the other services the SME has used within the bank. The additional infor-
mation that the fund provider has collected over time should remain confidential and 
collecting the information is a continuous process. Soft information might be in the ex-
clusive use of a single loan manager, which is why it might not be observable and veri-
fiable by other parties within the financial institution. This can be either an asset, or a 
burden in terms of using the information efficiently. Based on the soft information gath-
ered over time loan managers are able to form subjective judgements about the trust-
worthiness of the company. 
Moro, Fink and Kautonen (2012) discussed that voluntarily disclosed information is 
categorized as neither hard nor soft information, although the information collection and 
recording methods are rather similar to the characteristics of soft information. It is seen 
as a source of information to complement publicly available hard data and soft infor-
mation gathered through observation. It is defined as information on the firm’s past and 
future economic performance, which is relevant for the borrower’s decision-making, but 
it is only available if the lender voluntarily decides to disclose it. Without the lender’s 
consent to disclose the information, the borrower would not be aware of its existence 
and would not be able get access to it in any other way. The information is not publicly 
available and cannot be collected via third parties or through plain observation. The en-
trepreneur may use voluntarily disclosed information as a strategic mean to enhance the 
lending relationship, which, in the best-case scenario, can act as an effective mean to re-
duce the information gap from both parties’ perspective. However, bad entrepreneurs 
may abuse this method by disclosing misleading or faulty information to loan managers 
in order to enhance their credit availability for the wrong reasons. A high level of trust 
could increase the risk of misuse by fraudulent entrepreneurs.  
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Moro, Fink and Kautonen (2012) suggest that the three aforementioned information 
collection methods, hard, soft and voluntarily disclosed information, each affect the 
lender’s awareness and perception of the entrepreneur's competence and therefore im-
proves their ability to discriminate creditworthy and and not creditworthy customers. 
2.2 Transaction lending and SME financing 
The theoretical framework for this thesis lies within a lending technique called relation-
ship lending. Relationship lending is rarely used as a sole method for loan decision 
making, which is why it is necessary to describe the other lending technique, transaction 
lending. Hard and soft information complement each other and the forms of information 
are rarely seen as either/or options, but for research purposes, it is necessary to differen-
tiate the two lending techniques. This section introduces the most common transaction 
lending techniques used in the SME context and the main benefits and challenges it 
poses in terms of SME financing. 
2.2.1 Transaction lending techniques 
Research on bank lending is commonly divided under two main categories, transaction 
lending and relationship lending. Defined by Moro & Fink (2012), the key difference 
between transaction and relationship lending is that the loan decisions are primarily 
based on hard information in transaction lending and on soft information in relationship 
lending. Transaction lending can be broken down to numerous different techniques, but 
they are all characterized by the fact that the risk of the transaction is evaluated on pub-
licly available, verified information, which is independent from the quality of the rela-
tionship between the lender and the borrower.  
The three most common transaction lending techniques are (1) financial statement 
lending, which is solely based on the information from financial statements, (2) asset-
based lending, which relies on a provision or a collateral with the borrower and (3) 
credit-scoring lending, which is based on statistical techniques to assess the lender’s de-
fault risk. In addition, other effective lending techniques are (4) factoring and (5) trade 
  
 
credit, which are two commonly used transaction lending techniques that provide infor-
mation for credit decisions to reduce companies cash shortages in the short-term (Beck 
and Demirguc-Kunt 2006, Berger & Udell 2006).  
Berger & Udell (2006) summarized the five transaction lending techniques and con-
sidered in which extent they solve the opacity problem of SMEs. (1) The borrower’s fi-
nancial statement’s strength is at the core of credit access in financial statement lending 
and is primarily based on hard information. The lenders assess the borrower's creditwor-
thiness based on future cash flow expectations, as it is the primary indicator for loan re-
payment. Using this technique requires the borrowers to provide audited and informa-
tive financial statements and a strong financial state calculated from the statements. The 
financial statement analysis result in different loan contract conditions as the results 
might require additional personal guarantees, loan covenants or collateral. This is a fea-
sible and relatively low-cost technique for informationally transparent firms which oper-
ate in countries with developed financial and legal institutions. In addition, companies 
at their early stages cannot provide robust historical data. The early years of operation 
might have been unprofitable which does not provide feasible prospects about the prof-
itability of future investments. 
In (2) Asset-based lending the lender considers the borrower’s underlying assets as 
the main source for loan repayment. The lender does not consider the borrower’s credit-
worthiness as such, but rather they value the specific assets under collateralization. The 
assets are used as collateral for the loan and it can be considered for both short-term and 
long-term credit demand. In short-term financing the loan proceeds are used to finance 
working capital shortages, in which case the short-term assets, such as inventories and 
accounts receivables, are taken into consideration. In long-term financing for example 
the equipment for which the loan application is targeted for can be taken as collateral 
for loan repayment. This lending technique is purely based on hard information and the 
liquidation value of the underlying assets. Thus it can be used by large financial institu-
tions without the problems related to diseconomies of scale. Asset-based lending can be 
used partially to support loan decision making. However, using purely the asset-based 
lending technique requires well-developed institutions and it is in use only in four coun-
tries, which again makes it a non-feasible method for most SMEs in its pure form. 
The third commonly used relatively new transaction lending technique, (3) Small 
business credit scoring, is based on third party hard information about the SME and/or 
its owner. The banks use third party sources to collect the business owner’s personal 
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consumer data in conjunction with data about the SMEs credit information. The data 
can be assessed quickly through a predetermined prediction model in order to create a 
credit score for the loan applicant. The credit scoring models are usually designed for 
smaller loan amounts and the model can effectively sort out good and bad borrowers. 
Yet again, this technology is completely based on hard historical data and does not con-
sider the borrower’s future prospects. In addition, it does not support trial-and-error type 
of entrepreneurship as past poor performance leads to bad results for the borrower. 
As mentioned earlier, (4) factoring and (5) trade credit, provide a transaction lending 
based solution for short-term financing. Neither of them require a well-developed lend-
ing infrastructure, which make them a very useful technique for informationally opaque 
SMEs. (4) Factoring is very similar to asset-based lending, as it values the underlying 
assets in the lending decision. In this technique the lender simply purchases the bor-
rower’s accounts receivables, and it is up to the creditor to take care of the collection of 
receivables. This is commonly used by companies as a way to outsource their credit and 
collections function as well as to get additional financing. Factoring does not require the 
lender to assess the overall creditworthiness of the borrower, instead they are more in-
terested in the value of the receivables and the creditworthiness of the borrower’s cli-
ents. (5) Trade credit uses a combination of the aforementioned lending techniques 
which utilize hard information in addition with some relationship lending attributes such 
as trust in the process to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness. It is categorized as its 
own lending technique, as it is viewed as an important source of credit for SMEs. The 
basic idea of trade credit is to allow the borrower to buy a stock of goods with an ex-
tended or a flexible payment schedule. It gives the borrower flexibility to pay for the 
stock depending on their success on selling the goods. 
2.2.2 Transaction lending in the SME context 
This chapter introduces what the key benefits and challenges for using transaction lend-
ing as a lending method in the SME context. Based on the aforementioned techniques 
transaction lending can be a feasible way to finance even informationally opaque busi-
nesses at specific situations as described before, but using transaction lending solely 
poses certain restrictions in the SME context. Due to these reasons transaction lending 
  
 
is often complemented by relationship lending to cover for insufficient information ac-
quired by transaction lending (Bartoli, Ferri, Murro & Rotondi 2013).  
Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) considered the banks’ ability to lend to SMEs and 
they found that relationship lending services are difficult to provide to SMEs when the 
bank is large, has a foreign ownership or especially at times when the bank is facing fi-
nancial distress. Companies tend to ensure their credit availability by borrowing from 
multiple banks when their primary bank is facing financial distress. They also found, 
that in lending purposes small firms are more likely to rely on an exclusive bank rela-
tionship. 
Berger and Udell (2006) stated that a key benefit for using transaction lending in 
large institutions is that hard financial data is easy to observe, verify and transmit 
throughout the organisation.  Furthermore, larger institutions hold a comparative ad-
vantage for using transaction lending in relation to small institutions as they have the 
means and the third party information sources to collect hard information about the bor-
rowers. Large institutions have formed formal processes for transaction lending pur-
poses. Brown and Zehnder (2007) considered the effects of information sharing between 
lenders on the borrower’s repayment behaviour in a competitive credit market. The 
found that the expectation is that by having a good credit record the borrowers can fur-
ther improve their access to credit, which in turn enhances the repayment rates. This 
type of credit reporting valuable especially in markets where close banking relationships 
are hard to establish. 
Large banks face several problems when providing credit to informationally opaque 
SMEs via transaction lending. Firstly, it could be difficult to distinguish the company’s 
financial situation from the owner’s personal financial situation, as in very small busi-
nesses these are often aligned (Berger, Klapper & Udell 2001). Small banks are better at 
processing soft information over large banks and large banks tend have a more imper-
sonal relationship with their client compared to small banks. Secondly, small business 
lending is very costly due to the fact that the available information is poor in quality and 
collecting this information requires a lot of personnel. Thirdly, collecting information 
about an informationally opaque small business requires a local presence and personal 
contact with the company, which makes it difficult for large institutions to access neces-
sary information about the lenders. Finally, a majority of the relevant SME information 
is soft information, which is difficult to communicate and verify within large institu-
tions (Berger & Udell 1995; Petersen & Rajan 1995; Petersen & Rajan 2002). 
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2.3 The relationship lending framework 
The underlying motivation for relationship lending research is to reduce the information 
asymmetry between informationally opaque businesses and banks in loan decision mak-
ing. The theory on relationship lending suggests that it may be economically beneficial 
to form close relationships between the businesses and banks. Relationship lending is 
commonly defined as a long-term implicit contract between the lender (bank) and the 
borrower (company). The lender collects information about the borrower through fre-
quent interaction throughout the relationship. Several factors affect the lender’s image 
and trustworthiness about the borrower and in exchange the borrower is more prone to 
disclose confidential information to the lender the more trustworthy they are (Elsas 
2005).  
Although relationship lending is viewed as being beneficial for both parties as it re-
duces the information gap which leads to more efficient debt distribution, it is not the 
most common type of financing. Relationship lending does not occur without additional 
costs and there are several factors which might reduce the benefit of close bank ties with 
a single borrower (Howorth & Moro 2006; Moro & Fink 2012; Howorth & Moro 2012; 
Moro, Fink & Kautonen 2012).  
This section of the literature review will take a closer look into the concept of rela-
tionship lending by firstly introducing the empirical determinants of relationship lend-
ing. Then, the most common attributes of relationship lending will be discussed in fur-
ther detail. Finally, the effects of relationship lending will be discussed.  
2.3.1 The empirical determinants of relationship lending 
One important aspect is to consider which kind of situations are most likely to enhance 
relationship lending type of bank relationships. Elsas (2005) identified three potential 
determinants for relationship lending type of financing, which will be described below 
with further detail. These determinants are used to assess whether the relationship is 
more likely to be based on relationship lending or other types of lending techniques, or 
a combination of many. The determinants are (a) the borrower’s characteristics; (b) the 
bank’s characteristics and (c) the characteristics and conditions of the markets, or the 
lending infrastructure as discussed earlier.  
  
 
(a) The borrower’s characteristics include factors such as the size and quality of the 
firm, the lack of available information and the company’s access to public debt of eq-
uity markets. For example, young and SMEs do not provide similar regulated financial 
statement reporting as large corporations are obliged to do, which reduces the trustwor-
thiness and availability of the available hard information. Furthermore, in the case of 
start-ups or firms that are under financial distress, the hard data does not realistically tell 
about the future prospects of the company. 
(b) The bank’s characteristics describe which type of bank is in question, for exam-
ple whether it is a savings, cooperative or a private bank. The relative size and location 
are also important characteristics. A common belief about relationship lending is that 
the technique is often preferred by small, niche banks due to their ability to form per-
sonal relationships between loan managers and the company representatives. De la 
Torre, Pería & Schmukler (2010) questioned the common belief that most large banks 
neglect lending to SMEs due to their “chronic opacity”, and that large banks rather 
leave serving this segment to small and niche banks. Smaller banks have a comparative 
advantage for reducing information asymmetries through relationship lending, but De la 
Torre, Pería & Schmukler concluded, that private banks of all size view SMEs as a stra-
tegic customer segment that has highly profitable prospects for growth. They do not 
question the importance of relationship lending in the case of SMEs, but instead show 
that large banks have developed different means to evaluate the creditworthiness of 
SMEs by exploiting their economies of scale and scope. For example, large banks can 
use their extensive networks to acquire information from third parties such as the SMEs 
supply and outsourcing relationships, and thus tend to rely more on transaction lending 
techniques in their lending decisions.  
The third determinant (c) The characteristics and conditions of the market determine 
which lending techniques are feasible in the environment the SMEs operate. Elsas 
(2005) characterise this determinant by the regulatory, market structure and competitive 
aspects of the lending market, but this can be broadened by using Berger & Udell’s 
(2006) lending infrastructure. As discussed in the first section of the literature review, 
Berger & Udell (2006) considered the restrictive implications of the lending infrastruc-
ture. For SMEs operating in countries with poorly developed lending infrastructure the 
lending options are limited. Short-term financing needs can be covered by short-term 
transaction lending techniques which do not require a vast amount of hard information 
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about the borrower, but in the long-term relationship lending could be the most feasible 
option.  
The unique combination of the three determinants above determine whether the bank 
relationship most likely relies on transaction or relationship lending as the primary lend-
ing technique. This could be simplified in a graphic visualisation as in Figure 1, in 
which there are two types of situations with different characteristics. The shape on the 
left side of the figure describes scenario (1) in which the company and the bank operate 
in a well-developed lending environment, which is visualized as a wide area and a 
round shape. The company is physically located far away from the bank and the bank is 
large in relation to the company. On the right hand side in scenario (2) the lending envi-
ronment is not well-developed, which is why it is visualized as a narrow oval. The com-
pany and the bank are physically located close to each other and the size of the bank is 
small in relation to the company. In the first scenario the bank relationship would most 
likely rely on transaction lending techniques as the lending infrastructure is well devel-
oped, the bank and the company is physically located far apart and the bank is relatively 
large in size. The second scenario represents a situation where relationship lending 
would most likely be the primary lending technique, where the lending infrastructure is 
narrow and poorly developed, the company and the bank are physically located close to 
each other and the bank is relatively small. This figure is merely a theoretical simplifi-
cation of the relationship between the empirical determinants described in this chapter. 
 
Figure 1 The empirical determinants of relationship lending 
  
 
2.3.2 The common relationship lending attributes 
Relationship lending can be empirically measured with multiple attributes, which affect 
the intensity of the bank-borrower relationship. This chapter first introduces the inde-
pendent variables used in this paper: Informal information; Length of bank-borrower re-
lationship and Frequency of contact with loan manager. The attributes used in the study 
of this thesis can be identified by a star sign (*) at the end of the title. In addition to the 
aforementioned variables, there are numerous other attributes which can be used in em-
pirical relationship lending research. For the purpose of this study, only the most com-
mon attributes will be introduced in this chapter. The attributes Number of bank rela-
tionships; The amount of loan from primary bank and Share of debt financing will be 
described after the independent variables. Additionally, firm age and firm size are typi-
cally used measures in relationship lending research, and they are described in the 
Methods –chapter, as they are used as control variables in the study. 
2.3.2.1 Informal information* 
The first attribute Informal information can be also referred to as private information 
and it includes soft and voluntarily disclosed information about the borrower. Relation-
ship lending assumes that throughout the banking relationship the bank collects pri-
vately held informal information about the firm, the managers and owners and the 
firm’s financial performance (Berger and Udell 2006). The amount of informal infor-
mation is affected by various characteristics of the bank relationship, such as the length 
of the relationship and frequency of contact, which are described below as individual at-
tributes (Moro, Fink & Kautonen 2012).  
The level of trust between the lender and borrower heavily affects informal infor-
mation in the bank relationship. In the context of relationship lending, trust is important 
so that the exchange of informal information is possible in the first place. Howorth & 
Moro (2006) concluded that by enhancing trust in entrepreneur-bank relationships both 
parties could increase trustworthy behaviour and this could lead to a spiral of trust. In 
turn, the bank’s heavy monitoring might lead to reduced trust and less trustworthy be-
haviour and lower demand for financing from the monitoring bank. 
Moro & Fink (2012) were the first ones to include trust as a variate in an empirical 
study on lending relationships. As referred earlier, they concluded that a higher level of 
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trust between loan managers and SMEs result with better loan conditions. The trust 
components they included were the customer’s ability, benevolence and integrity. They 
highlighted that in strong lending relationships trust can positively affect the amount of 
informal information loan managers are able to access, both soft and hard information. 
Trust is especially an important means for very small companies, who lack the neces-
sary information regarding loan decisions. The implication of this result is that since the 
lender’s subjective perceptions towards the borrower’s creditworthiness significantly af-
fects the price and the amount of credit granted, it is beneficial for the borrower to 
openly disclose informal information about the state of the company.  
The characteristics of informal information, such as the amount, quality and the role 
of informal information gathered over time are difficult to reliably quantify as numerical 
measures. In this study the role of informal information is assessed as a measure based 
on the company representative’s subjective assessment about information information’s 
role in the loan decision process.  
2.3.2.2 Length of bank-borrower relationship* 
Elsas (2005) defined Length of the bank-borrower relationship as the most commonly 
used attribute in applied empirical research on relationship lending. Basically the length 
of the relationship is assumed to reflect the level of the relationships intensity over time. 
Elsas pointed out that assuming the length of the relationship to be equivalent to accu-
mulating private information over time it could also suggest that the borrower’s lock-in 
with the lender increases in parallel with the duration. This in turn raises switching costs 
and increases the bank’s bargaining power over the bank contract. 
As the length of the bank-borrower relationship reflects the accumulation of soft in-
formation over time, the longer the relationship has been, the longer the lender has been 
able to evaluate the borrower’s financial performance and characteristics. The accumu-
lation of private information is a relevant factor in the loan decision process (Moro, 
Fink & Kautonen 2012).  
  
 
2.3.2.3 Frequency of contact with loan manager* 
The frequency of contact with loan manager can be seen either as a strengthening or as a 
weakening attribute in terms of relationship lending financing. High frequency of con-
tact might indicate the lender and borrower to have a robust relationship and that they 
could have a more trusting relationship. However, at the same time, high frequency of 
contact could be a signal of poor trust, where the lender is forced to monitor the bor-
rower. This in turn might lead to less trustworthy behaviour by both parties, as argued 
by Howorth & Moro (2006) in their trust research.  
Uchida, Udell & Yamori (2012) were first to empirically confirm the commonly sug-
gested hypothesis, that loan managers in commercial banks hold a critical role in terms 
of the bank relationship with SMEs. Loan managers have an important role collecting 
soft information about the borrowers. Uchida et al. research also proved that frequent 
contact and a more sustainable relationship with a single loan manager results in higher 
accumulation on informal information, whereas frequent turnover on the assigned loan 
manager results in poor and unsustainable information production. In addition, their 
study affirmed that small banks are able to gather more informal information as opposed 
to their larger counterparts and thus rely more on relationship lending.  
2.3.2.4 Number of bank relationships 
Elsas (2005) discussed that the number of bank relationships could act as an indicator as 
to whether relationship lending is present in the bank relationship. This is supported by 
the fact that by maintaining exclusive bank relationships it enhances a close relationship 
between the lender and borrower.  As a result, competition between banks reduces, ac-
cess to informal information increases and the usage economic benefits of relationship 
lending eases. On the contrary, an exclusive bank relationship is neither necessary nor 
enough in order for the relationship to effectively be categorized as relationship lending.  
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2.3.2.5 The amount of loan from primary bank and Share of debt financing 
The name of the attribute The amount of loan from primary bank is self-explanatory, as 
the attribute tells how big of a share of the company’s loan financing is acquired from 
the primary bank. Share of debt financing refers to the relationship between debt and 
equity in the company’s balance sheet. Share of debt financing is used as a control vari-
able in this study, and it is derived from the financial statement figure Debt to total as-
sets. 
The amount of loan from primary bank and the Share of debt financing are both indi-
cators related to the previous attribute Number of bank relationships, in that, the same 
benefits and challenges apply. Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) stated, that SMEs, 
which rely on relationship lending due to challenges caused by information asymmetry, 
tend to have a single lender compared to other companies. For the borrower, it is benefi-
cial to rely on a single lender if they wish to reduce costs related to debt financing. Fur-
thermore, Elsas (2005) argued that the higher the share of the company’s debt financing, 
the more likely relationship lending is applied in the loan decision process. This is de-
rived from the presumptions mentioned above relating to the number of bank relation-
ships.  
2.3.3 The effects of relationship lending 
Relationship lending literature covers multiple aspects around the framework and the re-
search has often focused on the effect of the relationship on the contractual terms, such 
as the interest rates, collateral and covenants on the loan contract. Although some of the 
effects have been aforementioned in the literature review, in this section, the most im-
portant implications of relationship lending will be highlighted in the timely order they 
were discussed.  
Petersen and Rajan (1994) studied the benefits of lending relationships for small 
businesses. They suggested that firms form relationships with financial institutions 
through using their financial services. The banks are then able to collect non-public in-
formation about the companies over time, as they gain historical information about the 
companies’ financial performance. They noted that small business borrowing is highly 
concentrated to one of few financial institutions. A strong relationship results in lower 
  
 
prices but the length of the relationship did not seem to impact the rates charged. More-
over, multiple banking relationships lessened the strength of the bank relationship, thus 
increasing the loan rates. Berger and Udell (1995) however found that the length of the 
relationships does significantly affect the rates charged. They also argued that longer 
banking relationships have a negative correlation with required collaterals. 
Cole (1998) tested whether pre-existing bank relationships have an impact on credit 
access. He found that companies who already used the banks’ financial services, and 
more specifically if they had a savings account and relied on the banks’ financial man-
agement services, the companies were more likely to extend credit from the primary 
bank. This suggests, that the prior financial services generate valuable information for 
the lender about the borrower’s financial prospects. He also found that companies’ mul-
tiple banking relationships decrease the likelihood of credit availability. This supports 
the theory that multiple banking relationships reduce the value of the private infor-
mation collected by the banks, as the company uses several providers of financial ser-
vices.  
Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) summarized the relationship lending literature up to 
date and they discussed how relationship lending affects credit availability and quantity, 
interest rates and the use of collaterals. The results are contradictory between studies but 
the underlying outcome is that in majority of the studies, relationship lending results in 
better credit availability and lower interest rates. They discussed that multiple banking 
relationships are less valuable for relationship lending activities than single lender rela-
tionships. Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that the as a result of multiple banking rela-
tionships loan prices increase and credit availability decreases. Cole et al. (2004) hy-
pothesised that banks prefer to be the only provider of the companies’ financial services, 
because that way they are more capable of collecting private information.  
Howorth and Moro (2006) discussed that higher level of trust between banks and en-
trepreneurs could lead to more trustworthy borrower behaviour. They also proved that 
soft information plays at least as significant a role as hard information in terms of devel-
oping trust between banks and entrepreneurs. Overall high levels of trust benefit the 
banks by reduced agency problems, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, which 
in turn reduces the need for screening and monitoring (Akerlof 1970; Berger & Udell 
1995). From the entrepreneur’s point of view, high level of trust reduces their efforts on 
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providing additional information for monitoring purposes and potentially lowers the re-
quirements for collaterals. Therefore, trust may lower the costs of borrowing signifi-
cantly from both parties’ perspective. 
Howorth and Moro (2012) studied the role of trust over interest rates and they con-
cluded that the loan managers’ perception of the borrowers’ trustworthiness is corre-
lated with the overdraft facility’s interest rate. They also supported the hypothesis that 
trusting behaviour led to higher trust and vice versa. If the companies were monitored 
heavily, the trust was very low from both parties. Moro and Fink (2012) extended this 
result by proving that in situations where the loan managers trusted their SME counter-
parties, the SMEs were able to get more credit and were less credit constrained. 
Moro, Fink and Kautonen (2012) considered entrepreneurial competence together 
with information disclosed voluntarily, and how they are affected in terms of interest 
rates. They found that voluntarily disclosed information has a significant role on how 
the loan managers perceive the entrepreneur’s competence. They also showed, that the 
perceived competence has a negative correlation in terms of interest rates. 
Moro, Fink and Maresch (2015) examined different characteristics on how infor-
mation asymmetries can be reduced from the loan managers point of view. They looked 
at how short term credit access is affected by the amount, quality, completeness and 
timeliness of information the loan managers received, and also assessed the intensity of 
the relationship between the banks and the SMEs. They concluded that by reducing in-
formation asymmetries the firms were able to receive more short-term credit. They also 
showed that by hiding important information the SMEs could potentially harm the 
amount of credit they were able to get as it could reduce the reliability of the firm in the 
loan manager’s eyes. In fact, additional information is beneficial for both parties, in 
that, by having a better overall perspective over the firm’s financial situation, the loan 
manager is more capable and willing to support the firm. 
Kautonen, Fredriksson and Minniti (2016) studied trust-based banking from the 
SMEs point of view. Their study is based on the same survey as the one used in this pa-
per, but they focused primarily on how SMEs perceive the loan managers' trustworthi-
ness. They concluded that that trust plays a significant role on whether the companies 
received a sufficient amount of credit, especially in the case of young firms. The survey 
data used in this research is partially the same as in the latest working paper of Kauto-
nen, Fredriksson and Minniti (2016). This paper will extend their study by studying the 
  
 
effect of various other aspects of the banking relationship on the result of the credit ap-
plication. 
The previous studies discussed in this article have primarily focused on how relation-
ship lending typically influences the loan prices, credit availability, covenants and col-
laterals. Another interesting aspect studied by Jiangli, Haluk and Chiwon (2008) is how 
the relationship lending aspect benefits one another in times of financial distress. They 
studied whether the bank relationship is valuable in crises and how relationship lending 
and the availability of credit are associated to that. By studying the bank relationship in 
Asia during the Asian financial crisis, they found out that in some countries the credit 
availability was significantly more likely in situations where the companies had only 
one lending relationship instead of two or more. They argue that borrowers accepting 
higher interest rates for loans might expect lower interest rates in the future and better 
support and dedication from the lender during times of crisis. 
All in all, multiple studies have shown that relationship lending affects the loan deci-
sion making process in many ways, and by reducing information asymmetries by the 
means of relationship lending, both parties can benefit from the win-win situation. In 
the long run it is more beneficial for each party to maintain good relationships if they 
wish to pursue business activities in the future.  
2.4 Hypotheses 
The basic aim of this study is to assess whether certain soft factors, more specifically 
the selected relationship lending attributes, within the bank relationship have a signifi-
cant effect on the SMEs credit access. The hypotheses measure how the relationship 
lending attributes affect the loan decision. The dependent variable is the outcome of the 
latest loan application and the outcomes are either that the SME got less loan than they 
applied for or that they got the full amount. The independent variables used in the hy-
potheses are (1) The role of informal information, (2) Length of relationship with the 
primary bank and (3) Frequency of contact with loan manager. 
The first hypothesis proposes a direct projection about the significance of informal 
information in the lending process. The projection is based on the survey respondents’ 
subjective assessment about the role of informal information in the latest loan applica-
tion by asking them whether informal information played a minor or a major role in the 
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loan manager’s credit decision in the latest loan application. The hypothesis is derived 
from the theory, that the bank collects informal information about the firm, the manag-
ers and owners and the firm’s financial performance throughout the bank relationship, 
and that informal information has a significant role in the loan decision making process 
(Berger and Udell 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 1: When informal information had a major role in the latest loan applica-
tion the SME was more likely to access the requested amount of credit. 
 
The second hypothesis measures the effect of the relationship’s duration on the SMEs 
credit access. The hypothesis is based on the attribute of the second independent varia-
ble (2) Length of relationship with the primary bank. As discussed earlier in the litera-
ture review, the length of the bank relationship is argued to positively correlate with the 
intensity of the bank relationship, because the longer the relationship has been, the 
longer the bank has been able to collect private information about the firm. Through the 
collection of private information, the bank evaluates the trustworthiness of the firm 
(Moro, Fink & Kautonen 2012). The second hypothesis proposes that the longer the 
bank relationship is, the more likely the SME gets the full amount in their credit appli-
cation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A longer relationship between the SME and their primary bank has a pos-
itive effect on the SMEs credit access. 
 
The third hypothesis considers how the frequency of contact between the SME and the 
loan manager affects the credit access likelihood. The hypothesis assumes that high fre-
quency of contact with the loan manager has a positive effect in terms of credit access. 
The hypothesis is based on the assumption that the banks, which are more frequently in 
contact with their credit clients and have a more sustainable relationship with a single 
loan manager, have a better access on the informal information relevant to the loan deci-
sion process (Uchida, Udell & Yamori (2012). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Higher frequency of contact between the SME and the loan manager in-
creases the likelihood of credit access. 
 
  
 
The fourth hypothesis is divided in two parts 4a and 4b, which measure the effect of the 
two latter independent variables (2) Length of relationship with the primary bank and 
(3) Frequency of contact with loan manager over the first independent variable (1) The 
role of informal information. The two hypothesis test whether the two variables, which 
are typical proxies to measure relationship lending, have a significant effect on the sur-
vey respondents’ subjective assessment about the role of informal information. The pur-
pose of the fourth hypotheses is to support the theory, that the length of the bank rela-
tionship and the frequency of contact with the loan manager increases the quality and 
the amount of informal information gathered throughout the bank relationship (Berger 
and Udell 2006; Moro, Fink & Kautonen 2012).  
 
Hypothesis 4a: The length of relationship between the SMEs and their primary bank in-
creases the role of informal information in the loan decision-making process. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The frequency of contact between the loan manager and the SME in-
creases the role of information information in the loan decision-making process. 
 
Figure 2 shows a graphical illustration of the variables and hypotheses development. 
Model (1) is of primary interest and Model (2) provides with additional consideration 
over the independent variables in Model (1). 
 
 
Figure 2  The hypotheses 
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3 DATA AND METHODS  
3.1 Survey and data 
Kautonen, Fredriksson & Minniti (2016), collected the primary survey data used in this 
thesis for their earlier study on trust-based banking. Alongside with the survey data, 
hard financial data is used, which was obtained from a secondary source Orbis database. 
The primary survey data was collected through a questionnaire from SMEs in Finland in 
December 2014. According to a European Commission survey on the access to finance 
of enterprises (SAFE) (European Commission, 2016), in terms of the usage of bank 
loans Finland ranks very close to the average of the European Union, which makes the 
questionnaire on Finnish SME’s a suitable research context for this study.  
In the early stage of the study, Orbis database (Bureau von Dijk, 2014/2016) was 
used in order to identify firms for inclusion in the study. Firms with 10 to 249 employ-
ees were chosen from all sectors excluding insurance and financial activities, which met 
the European Union financial criteria for small to medium-sized enterprises: either total 
assets between 2 million and 43 million euros or turnover between 2 million and 50 mil-
lion euros, and turnover and assets both at least 2 million euros in 2013. In addition, an 
important selection criterion in terms of the research scope was to include only firms 
which had a positive level of either loans or long-term debt (at least 1000 euros in 
2013). This search identified 2790 suitable firms in terms of the survey’s scope. The 
hard financial data of the selected firms was downloaded from the Orbis database in or-
der to combine subjective and objective variables for the analysis. 
From the list of 2790 suitable firms, 1541 firms were contacted. In the first stage, the 
surveyed firms were first contacted via phone, in order to ensure that the respondents 
were managers in charge of the firms’ bank matters. If a suitable respondent (CEO, 
CFO, or equivalent) was reached and they were willing to participate in the study, they 
received a link to an online questionnaire by email right after the phone call. From the 
1541 contacted firms 834 agreed to participate in the questionnaire from which 433 an-
swered before the deadline, giving the survey a 52 % response rate. The nonresponse 
rate did not appear to constitute a major bias for the study. The nonresponse bias was 
controlled by comparing the mean number of employees and the means of several finan-
  
 
cial indicators between the 433 respondents and the remaining 2356 which did not par-
ticipate. Differences in the means were only marginal and the highest t-value for the test 
of equality was t=1.38 (p=.17). 
Out of the 433 respondents only the firms which self-reported of having bank debt 
were selected (n=389). Furthermore, the sample was filtered from two factors which 
could have biased the results. Firstly, foreign-owned firms were excluded from the rest 
of the analysis due to the fact that they constituted a small minority (n=21). Secondly 
observations which contained excessive numbers of missing values within the relevant 
variables of the analysis were also excluded (n=24). Thereby, the eligible sample for 
this study comprises of 344 firms. 
3.2 Methods 
The hypotheses are tested with a binary logistic regression model, which is an appropri-
ate statistical regression model for testing data that has a binary dependent variable. A 
binary dependent variable has only two possible outcomes, pass or fail, that are repre-
sented by numbers “0” and “1”. The numbers are not cardinal numbers, which is why a 
normal regression model is not a viable method for testing the outcome of such variable. 
The binary logistics regression model can be used for estimating the probability of the 
binary response based on one or more independent variables.  This study has one de-
pendent variable, Outcome of loan application, which yields the results of “1 Got the 
full amount” and “0 Got less than applied”, and three independent variables, The role of 
informal information, Length of relationship with the primary bank and Frequency of 
contact with the loan manager. In short, the model tests how the dependent variable, or 
the outcome of the loan application, is affected when one independent variable is varied, 
whilst keeping the other independent variables fixed. 
In the following subsections the dependent variable, the independent variables and 
the control variables used in the analysis are described in further detail.  
 
Dependent variable: Outcome of loan application 
The dependent variable for this study addresses the outcome of the previous loan nego-
tiations. The survey asked what was the outcome of the latest loan negotiation and the 
options were: (1) “The bank did not grant any loan”; (2) “The bank granted a loan, but 
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the amount was less than what we applied for” and (3) “We got the full amount we ap-
plied for”. In this study, the dependent variable is treated as a dummy variable where 
options (1) and (2) were grouped together as a negative outcome on the loan application 
and the option (3) as a positive outcome. So either the loan application resulted in “1 got 
the full amount” or “0 got less than applied”. 
 
Independent variables: The role of informal information, Length of relationship with the 
primary bank, Frequency of contact with the loan manager 
 
The first independent variable, which serves as the first explanatory variable is The role 
of informal information to the bank relationship. Informal information is one of the key 
factors of relationship lending and refers to all the soft information gathered throughout 
the bank relationship beyond the formal, audited and transparent financial data. Berger 
and Udell (2006) further conclude that the informal information serves as an ongoing 
confidential process throughout the bank relationship and in relationship lending the 
borrower heavily relies on the informal data to base their loan decisions. In the research 
the variable is a subjective estimate by the survey respondent to the question “In your 
opinion, how significant is the role of informal information to your company’s bank re-
lationship?” The measures are (1) none at all, (2) minor role and (3) major role. The an-
swer is treated as a dichotomous variable so that “none at all” and “minor role” grouped 
together are treated as an independent variable “the role of informal information is mi-
nor to the bank relationship” and “major role” solely as “the role of informal infor-
mation is major to the bank relationship”. The questionnaire led the respondent into the 
question by first describing that banks’ loan decisions are commonly based on the com-
pany’s financial statements, collaterals and formal future projections of the companies. 
Secondly, the questionnaire stated that banks’ loan decisions are also affected by infor-
mal information based on conversations after which the respondent was asked to esti-
mate how significant is the role of this information in their bank relationship.  
The second independent variable is The length of relationship with the primary bank. 
This is the most frequently used measure in relationship lending research according to 
the summarizing research on the relationship lending empirical determinants by Elsas 
(2005). The relationship length reflects the accumulation of privately collected infor-
mation over time and the depth of the bank relationship. The previous research on the 
length of the bank relationship has primarily focused on its effect on loan rates, which 
  
 
should be discriminated from the credit availability. The questionnaire formulated the 
question as “How long has your company been your primary banks’ customer?”. The 
answer options were divided in five divisions in length order: (1) less than a year, (2) 1-
2 years, (3) 3-5 years, (4) 6-10 years and (5) over 10 years. In the study, the length of 
relationship is measured as an ordinal variable and the responses are grouped in three 
categories in order to ensure sufficient cell counts in the categories of the variable, be-
cause some of the five categories above contained few observations. The first 3 options 
are grouped together as the first category and the fourth and fifth are treated as the latter 
two categories. 
The third independent variable is Frequency of contact with the loan manager. This 
variable aims to assess the intensity of the bank relationship, which is a measure of rela-
tionship lending. This can be interpreted as a strengthening factor in the bank relation-
ship or as a mean for the bank to monitor the debtor. The survey question was addressed 
by the question “How often have you been in contact with your loan manager during the 
past year (in person, via phone or via e-mail)?”. The answer options were (1) not once, 
(2) once, (3) 2-3 times, (4) 4-5 times and (5) over five times. In order to measure the 
variable effectively, the answers are grouped to an ordinal variable with three catego-
ries: Answers (1), (2) and (3) are grouped as “3 times or less” and answers (4) and (5) 
are treated as sole variables, “4-5 times” and “6 times or more”. 
 
Control variables: firm age, number of employees, debt to total assets, profit margin, 
personal collateral, covenants 
 
The control variables are held constant in the analysis in order to test the relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables. The control variables selected for 
this study are variables, which are commonly used in relationship lending research, but 
are not of primary interest in terms of this study. The control variables are firm age, 
number of employees, debt to total assets, profit margin, personal collateral and cove-
nants. 
Firm age and the number of employees represent information about the companies in 
terms of their current state and size. The size and age of the firm are used in relationship 
lending to proxy how much hard information is available about the firm, and how the 
firm can benefit from relationship lending (Berger and Udell 1995). Firm age is meas-
ured in years, and theoretically the older the firm is, the more there is hard information 
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available. The number of employees is used in order to proxy the relative size of the 
firm. The assumption is that the bigger the firm is, the more hard information is availa-
ble. Neither of the control variables, firm age and the number of employees, are nor-
mally distributed, which is why a logarithmic transformation is used on both attributes. 
Personal collateral, covenants, debt to total assets and profit margin are typical 
proxies to represent transaction lending as banks typically use collaterals, covenants and 
financial ratios to assess credit applications in transaction lending. Via collaterals the 
lenders typically secure the loans from borrower insolvency, and the use of collaterals 
often reduce the prices of loans. Covenants are used in loan contracting to create rules 
for the borrower’s activities in order to secure the loan payments. The use of collaterals 
and covenants are assumed to positively affect credit access, which is why they are im-
portant control variables in the analysis. 
Debt to total assets is a measure of the company’s indebtedness. Loan managers use 
the leverage ratio to assess how well the company is able to meet their financial obliga-
tions. If the leverage ratio exceeds a certain limit, the company’s creditworthiness re-
duces. Typically, the higher the share of debt the company has in their assets, the less 
likely the company is able to get additional credit. Profit margin is used to measure the 
firm’s profitability. A higher profitability is beneficial for the company. Therefore, a 
high profitability ratio is assumed to result in better access to credit. 
Firm age, personal collaterals and covenants are derived from the survey data and 
number of employees, debt to total assets and profit margin are derived from the Orbis 
database.  
3.3 Reliability of the study 
The hypothesis tests of the study take into consideration only a limited amount of varia-
bles (independent variables) related to relationship lending, but additional control varia-
bles are used to in order to minimize the omitted variable bias.  
The descriptive statistics of each variable (dependent, independent and control varia-
bles) are shown in Table 1 under their respective headings. The second column named 
Additional information describes the variable in brief if necessary, and the source of the 
data is shown in parenthesis. The tables last columns show the min (minimum), max 
(maximum) and mean values of each variable. In addition, the standard deviations (SD) 
  
 
of the continuous variables are shown. Two of the continuous variables, firm age and 
number of employees were not normally distributed. Therefore, in order to ensure the 
robustness of the results, their logarithmic transformations were used in the regression 
analysis. 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics 
 
  
 
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficient matrix between each variable. Because the 
data includes ordinal variables, the correlation analysis was done by using the Spearman 
rank correlation method. Spearman rank correlation is able to measure the association 
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between two variables by using ranks between the variables. A negative correlation co-
efficient expresses that the variables have a negative correlation and vice versa. Table 2 
shows the correlation coefficients, which are denoted as Spearman’s rhos, and the star 
sign (*) denotes the coefficients that are significant in the 5 % level. All of the coeffi-
cients had less than .4 variances from zero, which indicates that none of the variables 
showed troublesome correlations in terms of the logistic regression analysis.  
 
Table 2  Correlation matrix 
  
 
 
 
The independent variables were also tested for multicollinearity by using the vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) analysis. The mean of the VIF scores was 1.93 and the high-
est score was 2.32, which indicates that multicollinearity is not a concern in this model. 
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4 RESULTS 
4.1 Hypothesis tests 
The hypotheses were tested by using a binomial logistic regression. Binomial logistic 
regression is an appropriate model to test data, which is a binary dependent variable. 
The regression analysis was run in two different models to test the hypotheses and the 
model specifications can be seen in Table 3. Model (1) tests the main Hypotheses 1, 2 
and 3, which measure the independent variables in relation to the dependent variable 
Outcome of loan application. Model (2) tests the secondary Hypotheses 4a and 4b, 
which explain the independent variables Length of relationship with the primary bank 
and Frequency of contact with the loan manager in relation to the first independent var-
iable The role of informal information.  
Table 3 reports the logit coefficients, standard errors and the Average Marginal Ef-
fects (AME) for both models. If the regression test showed statistical significance at the 
5 % level, it is shown as (*) at the end of the logit coefficients. The likelihood ratio chi² 
and McFadden Pseudo R² are reported at the end of the table. The LR chi² ratio in 
Model (1) is 70.89 with 11 degrees of freedom (P < 0.0001) and in Model (2) 30.98 (P = 
0.0006) with 10 degrees of freedom, and they are both statistically significant. So as a 
whole, the model significantly differs from a null hypothesis with no independent varia-
bles. 
 
  
  
 
Table 3  Binary logit estimates 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported in Model (1): the logit coefficient for The role of informal in-
formation reports significant results for major role in credit access. Major role had a 
positive correlation for the outcome of the loan application and it was statistically sig-
nificant (p < .001). Furthermore, the average marginal effect result shows that, that if 
the role of informal information had a major role in the loan decision process, the com-
pany had a 14% higher likelihood of getting the full loan amount as opposed to if the 
role was minor. 
However, the model does not support Hypothesis 2 and 3 as the logit coefficients are 
not statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 tested the effect of longer banking relation-
ships on credit access. For the variable Length of relationship with the primary bank the 
model reported that the longer the relationship with the primary bank the less likely the 
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company got the amount of loan they applied for. However, these results are not statisti-
cally significant (6-10 years p = .123, more than 10 years p = .377), therefore Hypothe-
sis 2 is rejected.  
Hypothesis 3 tested whether higher Frequency of contact with the loan manager re-
sulted in better access to credit. The model reports that if the frequency was 4-5 times, 
the company was more likely to get the amount of loan they applied for as opposed to 3 
times or less, but if the frequency was 6 times or more, the association was negative. 
This would suggest that contact with the loan manager 4-5 times during the past year 
would result in a good success ratio in the loan application, but this would require fur-
ther research. The results on Hypothesis 3 are also not significant (4-5 times p = .863, 6 
times or more p = .613), which is why Hypothesis 3 is also rejected. 
Hypothesis 4a and 4b report interesting results. The model supports Hypothesis 4b 
but does not support Hypothesis 4a. The logistic regression for the relation between the 
dependent variable The role of informal information and the independent variable Fre-
quency of contact with loan manager shows that higher frequency of contact with the 
loan manager significantly increases the role of informal information in the credit appli-
cation process. The results are also statistically significant (4-5 times p = .001, 6 times 
or more p < .001). The effects of this outcome in relation to Model (1) will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
Hypothesis 4a has positive correlation coefficients but the Hypothesis is rejected, as 
Length of relationship with the primary bank is not a statistically significant measure to 
explain the Role of informal information (6-10 years p = .509, more than 10  years p = 
.235).  
4.2 Discussion 
The results in Model (1) show, that only Hypothesis 1 (When informal information had 
a major role in the latest loan application the SME was more likely to access the re-
quested amount of credit) is supported by the model. This means that if the role of infor-
mal information is major rather than minor in the loan application process, the company 
had 14 % higher probability of getting the amount of loan they applied for (AME = .14). 
However, as the explanatory variable The role of informal information was only a sub-
jective estimate by the survey respondent, we can not reliably know the actual role of 
  
 
informal information in the loan decision making process. However, the model suggests 
that the survey responses have a positive correlation with the credit application out-
come. 
Hypothesis 2 (A longer relationship between the SME and their primary bank has a pos-
itive effect on the SMEs credit access) was rejected, since the results were not statisti-
cally significant. The logit coefficient of for the variable Length of relationship with the 
primary bank  suggests the opposite outcome by saying that the longer the banking rela-
tionship, the less likely the company was able to access credit. Although the model does 
not suggest that the length of the relationship has no significant impact in terms of credit 
access, it could be argued that the time frame used in the model is not long enough for it 
to make a significant impact. The time intervals were 5 years or less, 6-10 years and 
more than 10 years. For future research it could be valuable to lengthen the time inter-
vals to for example 10-year time frames. But as Hypothesis 4a reports significant re-
sults, the length of the bank relationship does have an impact to the role of informal in-
formation. This will be discussed in further detail below. 
Hypothesis 3 (Higher frequency of contact between the SME and the loan manager 
increases the likelihood of positive credit access) was rejected, since the results were not 
statistically significant. The logit coefficient for the test was Frequency of contact with 
loan manager. The base for the test was that the bank and the company were in contact 
3 times of less during the past year. Although not significant, the regression test 
showed, that if they were in contact 4-5 times the companies were more likely to access 
credit than when the frequency of contact was 3 times or less. And when the frequency 
of contact was 6 times or more, the regression showed a negative effect on access to 
credit. One could argue, that if the frequency of contact is too high, it could mean that 
frequent contact is for monitoring purposes. The model does not test for what purposes 
they have been in contact with and this could be further extended in future studies. 
Model (2) tested Hypothesis 4a (The length of relationship between the SMEs and 
their primary bank increases the role of informal information in the loan decision-mak-
ing process) by regressing the independent variable Length of relationship with the pri-
mary bank over the dependent variable The role of informal information. Hypothesis 4a 
is not supported by the model, as it is not statistically significant. But the correlation co-
efficients do have a positive effect over the dependent variable, which means that they 
do have a positive correlation.  
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 Hypothesis 4b shows that Frequency of contact with loan manager is positively cor-
related with The role of informal information. The test for average marginal effect 
shows that if the frequency of contact increased from 3 times or less to 4-5 times, the 
role of informal information had a 26 % higher change of having a major role in the 
loan decision process. If the frequency increased from 3 times or less to 6 times or 
more, the effect was 23 %. This result shows that although frequency of contact did not 
have a statistically significant impact on the companies’ access to credit, it does play a 
major indirect role in the loan decision making process via affecting the role of informal 
information. This could suggest that the contact has been for building up the relation-
ship rather than for monitoring purposes. 
The results do not support the commonly used hypotheses about the length of rela-
tionship with the primary bank or the frequency of contact between the loan manager 
and the company. However, several other studies show that there is a positive correla-
tion, which could suggest that the time frame and frequency used in the study are too 
small. A ten-year relationship with a bank is not that long if you consider that the aver-
age age of the companies within the survey was 36 years and the oldest was 161 years 
old. For future research there could be a longer time span to be tested. Another variation 
for further research could be that the variables would measure the quality of the rela-
tionship rather than the amount of interaction. 
As frequency of contact showed a significant positive correlation towards the role of 
informal information, one could extend the model by asking a specifying question about 
the purpose of the frequent contacts. On the one hand, high frequency of contact could 
suggest that the company is not trustworthy and the bank needs to be in contact with 
them in order to monitor their actions, and on the other hand, if the bank relationship is 
relatively young, the frequent contact could be a result of active relationship building.  
 
 
 
  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Research summary  
This thesis studies the effect of relationship lending on SME’s credit access from the 
companies’ point of view. Relationship lending is a lending technique, which relies on 
the soft information collected about the lender over a period of the banking relationship. 
Soft information differs from hard information in that hard information is verified and 
publicly available financial data which does not require a personal contact between the 
loan manager and the company. The relationship lending technique can be used in con-
junction with transaction lending or exclusively. Relationship lending often comple-
ments transaction lending in the loan decision making process, when informationally 
opaque SMEs can not provide with a sufficient amount of hard data to support the lend-
ing decision. 
The literature review firstly discusses problems related to a principal-agent situations 
and describes what is meant by hard and soft information. Then the key outcomes about 
transaction and relationship lending in the SME context are summarized from earlier 
studies and the most common attributes used to measure relationship lending activities 
are derived. Based on the findings 5 different Hypotheses are constructed. 
The Hypotheses are tested by using a survey data of 433 small to medium sized com-
panies in Finland. The attributes measured in the study are “the role of informal infor-
mation”, “length of relationship with the primary bank” and “the frequency of contact 
with the loan manager”. They are tested with a binary logistic regression over the binary 
dependent variable which measures whether the company accessed the amount of credit 
they primarily asked for or not.  
The results show that informal information plays a significant role in the credit deci-
sion process but the length of relationship and the frequency of contact with the loan 
manager do not. However, on a secondary model the frequency of contact with the loan 
manager does have a significant impact on the role of informal information, which sug-
gests that a high frequency of contact with the loan manager has been about relationship 
building rather than monitoring purposes. 
This thesis contributes to the existing research on relationship lending by examining 
the concept from a firm perspective. Furthermore, the results support the earlier studies 
by suggesting that informal information had a major role in the loan decision making 
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process and that higher frequency of contact increased the significance of informal in-
formation. 
5.2 Limitations of the study 
The study includes certain limitations, which the reader must keep in mind. Firstly, the 
data was collected only from Finnish companies. This restricts the focus in a single 
lending infrastructure and cultural context. The characteristics of the Finnish credit mar-
ket represents the European credit market quite well on average, but the Finnish lending 
infrastructure is relatively well developed within Europe. However, Finland is neither 
heavily relying on transaction nor relationship lending. A cross-cultural study could be 
an effective way to remove the bias of a single cultural environment. 
Secondly, the dependent and independent variables were based on a survey from the 
SMEs. The responses were the survey respondents’ one-sided subjective perceptions 
about the situations in question, which indicates that the survey data is not verified from 
the banks’ point of view. This problem could have been avoided by using a two-sided 
survey from the loan managers’ point of view, but unfortunately this is not possible due 
to legal restrictions in the Finnish bank data privacy. The hard financial data was col-
lected from a renowned Orbis database.  
Thirdly, the data consists only of SMEs, which typically are the most informationally 
opaque firms as they don’t have the access to public equity markets. For non-listed 
companies the reporting requirements are very low compared to publicly listed compa-
nies, so the results can not be extended to large companies. Therefore, it is emphasized 
that the results only apply to small to medium sized enterprises. 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
The principles and data used in this thesis could be extended for testing the effects of re-
lationship lending in family companies. By studying only family companies one could 
find interesting results over the effects of the same attributes used in this thesis and for 
example consider in depth the role of collateral and covenants in the hypotheses. 
Steijvers, Voordeckers & Vanhoof (2010) state that “the relationship between SMEs 
and banks is often characterized by asymmetric information, adverse selection and 
  
 
moral hazard problems” and that the problems might “lead to the problem of credit ra-
tioning which could be mitigated by the use of collateral in the credit contract”. They 
considered the impact of relationship characteristics, family ownership and their interac-
tion effects upon the use of collateral in SME lending by using a decision tree analysis. 
Their results suggested that when obtaining high amount loans, the private family own-
ership increases the likelihood of pledging collateral. They argued that this is due to the 
higher likelihood of free riding by family members or bad management. To extend the 
research one could exclude non-family owned companies from the dataset and focus on 
the characteristics from the perspective of family ownership. 
As the research context is solely limited to Finnish companies and the Finnish lend-
ing environment, future research could extend the study to a cross-cultural scope. The 
results of this study are useful in terms of the Finnish lending relationships, but can not 
be applied internationally. 
Finally, although Model (1) does not support Hypotheses 2 and 3, it does not denote 
that the attributes for length of relationship with the primary bank and the frequency of 
contact are not significant measures of relationship lending. As considered in the Dis-
cussion part, longer measures for relationship length with the primary bank and fre-
quency of contact could be adopted for future research purposes. 
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